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One of the traditionally difficult problems in the field of philosophy, religion and theology is the one that divine omniscience, specifically divine foreknowledge, poses for libertarian freewill of man. This is because the traditional understanding that God knows everything we will do in the future poses an apparent problem to the concept of libertarian freewill. After all, if we freely chose to do something other than what God foreknew, God would be wrong in what He foreknew; but since God cannot be mistaken we must do all that He foreknew we would do.  Does not this reduce us to mere actors, playing out the parts written for us by God?  Are we puppets who have no control over our own actions? It is disputable whether God possesses knowledge of the free choices that human, a free creature, will make and if such an action can be refer to as free in libertarian sense. This problem is couched in the words of Michael Murray and Michael Rea:
The belief that God knows the future in full and fine-grained detail raises difficult philosophical problems. For example, we are accustomed to thinking of the future as open – which is just to say that future events do not exist, and facts about the future are not ‘‘fixed’’ in advance. Indeed, many of our attitudes toward daily decisions seem to presuppose that the future is open in this sense.蜉

As it can be seen from this Murray and Rea’s assertion, the crux of the debate lies on the apparent incompatibility of divine prescience which makes the future inevitable or fixed and human sense of libertarian freewill. What makes the debate so intense lies in the elements of the two concepts; infallibility of God’s foreknowledge and the principle of alternative possibilities or counter-factual in libertarian freewill of the free agents. That is if God knows the future perfectly and totally (infallibly) then any action of a man to perform any future action known by God cannot said to be free. 

The history of church (from the first century to this twenty-first century) shows that there have been a lot of attempts by some fathers of the church and theological thinkers to proffer a logical solution to this debate. For examples, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Boethius, John Calvin and others have tried to offer logical answers to the dilemma. And philosophers today continue to try to rectify the problem by either attempting to redefine human freewill or some elements in the divine omniscience. Alvin Plantinga, in his attempt to solve the dilemma categorized the dilemma as “only midly atheological”蜉 According to him the main crux of dilemma is on the question of “would a supposed free man be free if he does not have the freedom to ‘refrain’”?蜉

Meanwhile, in these myriad of attempts, some solutions proffered have introduced some models that plague with other major Judeo-Christian theological standpoints. Some of these solutions have a lot of negative cost that are not worth the benefit. Various proposed solutions to the dilemma have important implications for one’s broader theology, and some of these implications, in the words of Evans and Manis, are not desirable.蜉 In view of this, this paper attempts to x-ray some of the attempted solutions and the problems associated with them and shall contrast these attempted solutions with Augustinian freewill theory. The paper argues that Augustine’s solution to the debate stands a lot of theological coherence and that it can be ‘reinstated’ to solve the on-going debate. The researcher of this paper believes that where some of the attempts to solve the dilemma err Augustine’s attempt stands. To showcase this, the paper first of all, succinctly highlights the dilemma, and proceeds to do a critical examination of four of the popular attempts to solve the problem (Boethian, Ochamist, Opentheists and Molinists) and compared these with the Augustine solution. The paper later highlights the implications of the Augustine solution to contemporary discourse on evil and concludes that Augustine position is more evangelical, orthodox and logically coherent than the other views. 

The Dilemma: A Brief look at the Problem 

Before we start to look at the attempted solutions to the divine omniscience-freewill dilemma, it is good to briefly do a critical survey of the problem itself. This will be done with emphasis on the elements within the two concepts that gave birth to the dilemma. Simple stated, the dilemma lies in the inconsistence between exhaustive divine foreknowledge and libertarian human freewill. This dilemma is succinctly characterized by Linda Zagzebski蜉 using Aristotelian syllogism:

1) At t1, God infallibly believed or knew that S would A at t2 (Assumption).
2) If an event E occurred at t1, it is necessary at t2 that E occurred (Principle of the
Necessity of the Past- PNP).
3) It is necessary at t2 that God infallibly believed at t1 that S would A at t2 (1,2).
4) Necessarily, if God has an infallible belief about X, X will occur (Definition of
Infallibility).
5) If p is necessary at t2, and necessarily p      q, q is necessary at t2 (Transfer of
Necessity Principle).
6) It is necessary at t2 that S will A at t2 (3,4,5).
7) If it is necessary at t2 that S will A at t2, S cannot do otherwise but A at t2 (Definition
of Necessity).
8) If S cannot do otherwise but A at t2, S does not act freely (Principle of Alternate
Possibilities).
9) Therefore, when S does A at t2, she does not do so freely (7,8)
From this characterization, one can easily deduce the main elements of the dilemma. First of the elements is infallibility of God’s foreknowledge. As Nelson Pike notes in Philosophical Review that the core problem of the dilemma lies in the belief in the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge.蜉 This is very true because if God knows infallibly that an action will happen then there is inevitability attached to that very action. The premises 1 and 3 of the above characterization show this. If God knows what a man will inevitably do, can we then say such a man is free since such a man has no choice than to do it because if he does not do it then the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge is put to dire question. Second, the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)蜉 also poses a great problem in the dilemma. Though there can be possibilities of what an agent would do in certain condition and God may know all these possibilities but since God knows with certitude (infallibility) what a free agent would do eventually, then there is no ground for counterfactual freedom hence such an action is not free since the agent could not have done otherwise.
Another element in the dilemma that makes it a strong debate is the concept of human libertarian freewill. The traditional view in some orthodox theological circles is that human beings are free in libertarian sense. Therefore, the concept of libertarian freedom which includes the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) is in stark conflict with the concept of infallibility in the essence omniscience of God. If a man is to be a free agent it is a requirement that he possesses freedom of alternate possibilities but such an infallible knowledge of God would undermine the very libertarian human freedom, for an agent cannot falsify the knowledge that God has held about him infallibly in regards to his future actions.蜉 The debate is not easily put to rest despite the many proposed solutions to the problem. To “many thinkers it seems that if God knows, already, what will happen tomorrow, then human freewill and responsibility must be a mere sham.”蜉
Now, one might wonder why freewill is of such a vast importance both in philosophical and theological discussion. Why should we care whether free will is compatible with divine foreknowledge? The debate on freewill and divine omniscience is very important because it hinges on many other philosophic-theological issues. On the one hand, it is a basic part of orthodox theism that God is omniscient and on the other hand it is equally a part of orthodoxy that God is just, and that he holds human beings accountable for their actions.蜉 If God has an infallible foreknowledge of all actions of a man, is it just for him to hold such a man accountable for his actions? In view of this, the argument from divine omniscience seems to demonstrate incompatibility among two of theistic definitions of God; his omniscience and his justice. In the words of Tina Talsma:
Freedom is necessary for moral responsibility and moral responsibility is an important element of personhood. The morally responsible person is capable of complying with the demands of morality. Freedom of a man makes him a being for whom it is appropriate that other expect of her that she so comply, and for whom praise and blame, as well as punishment or reward, might be fitting. Though freedom is not the only necessary condition for moral responsible agency, it is indispensable. Without freedom of some sort, the agent is not in control of her actions and thus cannot be appropriately held responsible.蜉
The biblical characterization of justice is often considered to be retributivist and thus eternal punishment and other eschatological issues are at stake if the dilemma is not given a logical solution. Not only this, the dilemma also has some stereological implications. The needed free choice that anyone who would be saved by the salvific work of Christ must have becomes only an hoax if God’s foreknowledge and human freewill dilemma is not well discussed and solved logically.
More importantly, the dilemma has some relationship with the Christian theodical theories,蜉 most especially, the freewill defence and moral evil. The freewill defence of Alvin Plantinga and the freewill theodicy蜉 of Aurelius Augustine lie on the fact that human beings are free to act or take decision on their own. The understanding of moral evil, freewill defence and theodicy lies in the existence of free, rational, and moral agents.蜉 So the concept of human libertarian freewill is essential to both the understanding of moral evil and freewill theodicy.
Having stated the dilemma in a more succinct way, the next segment of the paper shall discuss the various proposed solutions that have been offered to the dilemma and the pitfall of these problems. After this, the paper shall turn to Augustine’s solution and its plausibility in solving the dilemma, and the implication that this Augustinian solution would have in the contemporary discourse on evil.
Proposed Solutions to the Divine Omniscience- Freewill Dilemma
·	Boethian solution
One of the popular proffered solutions to the dilemma is offered by the sixth-century Christian philosopher Boethius. Boethius major arguments lie in his application of timelessness and eternality to the divine foreknowledge of God. He argued that divine eternality should be viewed as timeless. He opined that God is entirely separated from the temporal order.蜉 Nothing is future to God and he knows everything outside the temporal order. Manis and Zacharis provide succinct account of Boethian solution:
Boethius concluded that since God is outside of time, God does not strictly speaking, foreknow anything. Instead, every moment within creation is immediately present to God. Thus God’s means of knowledge of what we will do in the future (to Boethians) is the same as his means of knowing what we are doing now: he simply observes it.蜉
From this Boethian solution, one notices the concept of passivity of God in the human affairs. One of the aspects of this passivity lies in the fact that God knows the future (as present) does not make the future event necessary, since God only observes. Therefore the freewill-divine omniscience dilemma is solved according to Boethius, since God’s knowledge of what an agent would do does not render the agent’s action necessary, determined or coerced.蜉 There are a lot of problems with this Boethian solution. For example Paul Helm in his book titled Eternal God: A Study of God without Time蜉 argues that removing God’s knowledge from the temporal order has not solved the dilemma. Helm opined that even if God knows the future events as present and immediate, his knowledge is still infallible and contradicts the true, uncoerced freedom of man. Since God knows the future in any way, either as present or as past or as immediate, his knowledge still renders human freedom a smash. 
Another problem with Boethian solution is that it contradicts the Judeo-Christian definition of God. According to Judeo-Christian tradition, God participates in the affairs of men. Still, another problem with the Boethian solution is that it contradicts the biblical doctrine of providential guidance of the world. Moreover, Boethian solution contradicts the Biblical view of a divine person who has a meaningful, personal and responsive relationship with His creatures. The Bible accounts for a God who listens, responds and loves not in timeless but in actual situation. A God who simply pre-programs His responses, that Boethians would like us have, is not really engaging personally with His creatures.蜉 From all these difficulties arising from Boethian solution to the dilemma, one can see that the “model only seems to provide an answer to the dilemma, but it may not be the appropriate answer; for the benefit it provides in the foreknowledge debate may not worth the cost it extracts from the biblical account of divine providence.蜉
This argument, therefore, lacks the substantial solution to the problem. The paper proceeds to another proposed solution.
·	Ochamist Solution
William of Ocham was an eminent logician and a critical philosopher. One of his best known principles is the “Ocham’s razor.”蜉蜉 His writings, according to J.S Feinberg, contain concepts that illustrate some of the central notions of theonomy and voluntarism.蜉 William of Ocham was the founder of the school of thought called “Ochamism.” The strategy employed by the Ochamists in their attempt to solve the freewill-divine omniscience dilemma is to use distinction between hard and soft facts.蜉  Soft facts, Ocham claims, do not carry with them the necessity of the past, so this soft fact about a man cannot render his action necessary. Therefore Ocham argues that God’s past belief about our future free actions are soft facts and thus do not render the future actions to which they refer necessary. Furthermore, Ochamits denies the Principle of the Necessity of the Past. In reference to God’s past belief because the Principle (i.e PNP) can only be applied to hard facts.蜉
Like the Boethian solution discussed above, Ochamist solution also has some difficulties. The definition of divine omniscience in Ochamism seems inconsistent with God’s divine omniscience as traditionally believed. It is traditionally believed that God’s knowledge is not determined by actions of man but by His own act of knowing.  According to Fischer, God’s omniscience would be attenuated if the same state of God’s mind would have different beliefs about an agent, depending on the agent’s action. Also, there is unacceptable asymmetrical connection between God’s past beliefs and human beliefs in Ochamist solution to the dilemma. This is because it fails to give an adequate explanation of soft fact that both captures God’s knowledge as soft facts and is not ad hoc. The failure of the Ochamists to give a plausible solution to the freewill-divine omniscience dilemma lies in its inability to properly distinguish God’s past beliefs as soft when all other beliefs are clearly hard facts about the time at which they occur.
·	Molinist Solution
Molinism is named after its founder, a Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century. Molina attributed to God what has been traditionally referred to as “middle knowledge.”蜉 In Molinists’ solution, God possessed this knowledge prior to creation, and he used this knowledge to decide how he would create the world. Therefore human free actions are prior to God’s foreknowledge and it is the free actions that lead to the necessity of God’s foreknowledge and not the other way round. According to Craig William, one of the leading Molinists, there are three different types of God’s foreknowledge.蜉 Accordingly, God has natural knowledge of all necessary truths, including which possible world is open to him to actualize. This knowledge of God is natural and independent on His will. Another type of God’s foreknowledge is free knowledge of the actual world. This free knowledge is contingent and dependent on His will. And finally God has the middle knowledge or counter-factual knowledge. This is the knowledge of what each free agent will do in every possible situation. The method used in Molinism is making some subtle philosophical distinctions that make sovereignty and freewill compatible. 
Middle knowledge is found in the conceptual space between natural and free knowledge. Since God knows all the possible actions in his actualized world, He knows which possible world He has chosen to actualize, he knows with certitude how the actual world will unfold, then He would know what a free agent would do without necessarily coercing them. The Molinists often appeal to some biblical passages as evidence to corroborate their arguments. For example, the book of Mathew 11:21-24 shows this, where Jesus denounces Chorazin and Bethsaida. Jesus tells those cities that if the miracles that have been done in them were done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have believed long ago.蜉 This account and others have been used to argue that God knows what would happen given a different set of circumstances. There are objections and difficulties with this solution (i.e Molinist solution) also. 
The most commonly heard objection to Molinist solution is termed “the grounding objection.”蜉 The objection states that counterfactuals of human freedom (CFHs) are groundless. The question is “who causes the state of being that is true to be true, and the one that are false to be false. Molinists’ solution is not totally coherent because the CFHs are not well defined in the argument.  The fact that man’s action and the actualized world are not independent of God’s will because God creates the actualized world and this world in turn determines the human action in any given situation is problematic. Therefore, the freewill-divine omniscience dilemma is still not solved. Another objection to Molinists solution is that its definition of God’s sovereignty is not appropriately robust. God’s purpose do not depend on human actions, he does not discover or learn. Unlike the Molinist definition of God’s sovereignty, the Bible teaches that God is sovereign over all things (Prov. 16:33, Romans 11:36 etc).蜉
 Another major objection to the Molinist solution is aimed directly at its linchpin; the doctrine of middle knowledge.蜉 Middle knowledge is not that possible and it contradicts some aspects of traditional definition of divine omniscience. For example, the supposed object of middle knowledge is unknowable because the object is said by Molnists to exist prior to creation when there is nothing in existence that could ground the truth value of propositions about what merely possible free creatures would in fact choose in various, merely possible circumstances. Middle knowledge is therefore knowledge of facts that do not exist and so there can be no such knowledge. Also, if agent’s action is located in a sphere that is prior to creation that means such an action is not incompatibilistically free. Hence the solution does not solve the dilemma.
·	Opentheists Solution
Opentheism, also known as neo-theism, free-will theism, Openism or relational theism, is another proposed solution to the divine foreknowledge- freewill dilemma. It has received much attention in the contemporary scholarship in philosophy and theology. This school of thought was brought to fore by the Richard Rice publication titled “The Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free will and broader articulation of the school of thought was done in the book co-authored by Cark Pinnock and other four leading proponents of Opentheism.蜉 Opentheism posits that God does not know the future action of a free agent. Since he (God) has given libertarian freewill to man, he cannot pre-know what the free agent would do in future situations.蜉 Clark Pinnock and other proponents opined that God is a personal, dynamic, relational and loving God; He, God, partners with human beings. Opentheism maintains libertarian, freedom of alternative possibilities of man but denies God pre-science. The brand of human freedom held by the Opentheists is technically called “incompatibilistic freedom”蜉 The Opentheists argue that God himself feels bad when (moral) evil happens but there is nothing he can do since he cannot foreknow in detail.蜉 Gregory Boyd, one of the leading proponents, argues that future reality is composed of both open and settled, God knows the possible as possible and knows the settled as settled. It is the settled reality of the future that God foreknows perfectly and he has left open other aspects of the future and so he cannot foreknow this open aspect perfectly.蜉 
The Opentheists opine that God is omniscience for He knows everything that is possible to know and even what a free agent may likely do in the future but with regard to what a free creature will in fact do in some scenarios that have not yet transpired, there is not yet anything to know.蜉The Opentheists believe that since God has given libertarian freewill He has to adopt a “wait and see approach” before He knows what the free agents will do. There are a lot of critical difficulties in these standpoints of the Opentheists. First it contradicts the theological concept of divine providence, if God does not know what each of us will do in the future, how can he be in the in control of the world? Second, it conflicts with divine sovereignty that is so central a part of orthodox and evangelical Christianity. Also, it contradicts itself by the way it treats God’s foresight. According to Michael J. Murray and Michael Rea:
Given that God is omnipotent, it seems that there is nothing that anyone could possibly do that God could not foresee and prevent; for presumably there will always be a time between a free act of will and the physical effects of that free act, and God could surely foresee the physical effects once the act of will has occurred, even if he could not have foreseen the act of will itself. Thus, God can never be surprised by the physical effects of evil choices, and any misery that results from human action could have been prevented by him. Thus, again, it is hard to see why Openism offers any particular advantage, given that it doesn’t remove God’s foresight of suffering that result from human action but only shortens it.蜉
Opentheism or Openism (the two are the same) trivializes the exhaustive omniscience of God with the aim of reiterating human libertarian freewill.  Another objection to Opentheists’ proposed solution is that its hermeneutical methodology is faulty. The hermeneutical method of the Opentheists is an “exaggerated literalism” and establishing ‘canon-within-the canon.’ By this they are able to jettison very many biblical situations where God exercises his absolute foreknowledge. For example, the divine standard for any authentic prophetic ministry in the Old Testament is the criterion of fulfillment of its prophecy and some prophecies came to pass even in the lifetime of the concerned prophets, if God, then, does not have absolute foreknowledge, how would such a prophecy come to pass, and how would God make prophecy-fulfillment as the criterion for any genuine prophetic ministry? Lastly, the standpoint of the Opentheism has a lot of eschatological implications for example, if God does not know the future exhaustively how can we be sure of the rapture, tribulation, millennial reign, etc. Even though the Opentheists offer some theodical advantages in their philosophic-theological position, its solution to the divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma is not plausible and convincing.
So where are we going from here? This paper has done a critical discussion on the major responses to the divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma and has pointed out that even though these philosophical positions (Molinism, Boethianism, Opentheism, and Ochamism) are a powerful view with a great deal of theoretical utility, they suffer from fatal flaws. Each of these four main responses fails to deliver a solution that can help us to keep both God’s exhaustive foreknowledge and human libertarian freedom, in the classical sense of it. These views wanted to solve the dilemma but in the course of solving the problem, they have created another problem. So does it then mean that there is no solution to the dilemma? Should we trifle with God’s omniscience in favour of human freewill or should we trifle with human freewill in favour of God’s omniscience? Either of the two will have great negative theological, moral and philosophical implications and contradict major evangelical positions.
In view of this, this paper argues that the Augustinian on God’s foreknowledge visa viz human libertarian freewill position can be restated to fit in well in solving the dilemma. In what follows, I shall bring the salient elements in Augustine argument and restate it with the view of solving the dilemma. The paper argues that the errors of the above views can be corrected in the light Augustinian solution to the dilemma.
Restating Augustinian Position as a Solution to the Divine Foreknowledge-Freewill  Dilemma
In this part of this paper, an attempt is made to investigate the Augustinian solution to divine foreknowledge and freewill dilemma, and this will be juxtaposed with the views discussed above. This juxtaposition of Augustinian and others (Molinists, Ochamists, Boethian, and Opentheists) views on the dilemma reveals a great weakness in these four views. According to Colin Brown, the most outstanding thinker in the history of theology and philosophy was Augustine, the saintly Bishop of Hippo in North Africa.蜉 He was a genius who applied intellect to theology; he represents how philosophy can be useful in theological enterprise. He was born on 13 November 354 AD in Thagaste, now in Algeria. He had his primary and secondary education at Thagaste and Madaurus respectively between the age of 7 and 19 he had completed the course of his study and later went to Carthage. His father died prematurely and that made Augustine to suffer financially but was later helped by a wealthy benefactor, Romaninaus.蜉
Augustine had a lot of influences behind him. These include Apostle Paul (particularly Pauline Epistle to the Romans), Cicero (particularly Cicero’s Hortensius), Manichaeism, Ambrose of Milan, (Ambrose’ rhetoricism), Maius Theodorus, Porphyry, Ambrosiaster and others. Augustine gave four cogent theodical theories; principles of plenitude, aesthetic argument, free will theodicy and deprivation of good. Some of his theodical theories have been restated to meet up with the need in the contemporary scholarship. However, our main concern here is how Augustine responded to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and freewill. Augustine maintains, contrary to the four views discussed above, that all contingent matters of fact are completely known by God prior to their occurrence. Augustinianism avers the strongest conception of divine providence, that is, God’s control over his creation is absolute and meticulous.蜉
Augustine argued that Freewill is an essential constituent of human nature and the greatest gift of God’s goodness in the creation of man. To Augustine, man has freewill in the sense that the will of man is not subjected to coercion, though the will of man is corrupted and depraved by the original sin (this is the bone of contention in Augustine-Pelagius controversy). While man, to Augustine, is free in libertarian sense, God knows all the past, present, and future (eternalism) as against the “presentism” and middle foreknowledge in Opentheism and Molinism respectively. Augustine did not differentiate between the types of God’s foreknowledge (molinism) and the types of realities to be known (Opentheism). That is, unlike the Molinists who distinguished the types of God’s knowledge (free, natural and middle) and the Opentheism who distinguished between the types of future realities (Settled future realities and Open future realities), Augustine believed that God eternally knows all things., and His knowledge includes the past, future,  and present. 
Now, how did Augustine solve the apparent contradiction between the Omni-foreknowledge of God and libertarian freewill of man? Augustine distinguished predictability and prescience from causality and coercion. The fact that God pre-knows perfectly what a free agent will do in the future does not mean that God is the cause or that God coerces the free agent to do whatsoever. The decision of a free agent is still free even though God knows perfectly what the free agent will do. Augustine believed that God’s foreknowledge and libertarian freewill is not contradictory. Augustine says that:
For example your recollection of events in the past does not compel them to take place. As you remember certain things that you have done and yet have not done, all things that you remember, so God foreknows all things of which He himself is the Cause, and yet He is not the cause of all that he foreknows.蜉
In other words, God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of our actions; our actions are the cause of God’s foreknowledge.  God’s knowledge of all future contingent acts is chronologically prior to those acts. This makes sense because knowledge has no causal powers.  It cannot cause anything, so therefore God’s knowledge of the future cannot be the cause of our acts. Augustine also distinguished between the foreknowledge and necessity of our acts. Augustine says that God foreknowledge of our future actions does not make them necessary. Plantinga in support of the Augustine, writes that the conflict between omniscience and human freedom is not a problem, because we are saying “Necessarily, if God knows in advance that X will do A, then indeed X will do A,” not, “If God knows in advance that X will do A, then it is necessary that X will do A.”蜉 Augustine’s position is plausible because it succinctly solve the Sovereignty- freewill contradiction alongside his solution to the freewill-foreknowledge dilemma. Augustine believes that God is in total control of the universe but His providence is not limited by man’s freewill, and man’s freewill does not attenuate the God’s providence.
Some anti-Augustinian scholars argued that if God knows the future exhaustively as Augustine opined then God should be held responsible for any evil action of man. But a critical look at the Augustine’s position solves this objection. Augustine argued that God does not do evil and He cannot will evil but he knows that evil will occur in future action of a “free” agent. But God cannot remove totally the possible future-evil without removing freewill and if God should remove human freewill, moral good will also be impossible. So for God to create a world where there is moral goodness, libertarian freewill is essential for any moral goodness but the freewill, which is essential for moral goodness, can also be misused by man. This misuse of freewill by a free agent is the cause of evil not God.蜉
Augustine based his solution to Divine foreknowledge- Freewill dilemma on logical reasoning and holistic Biblical/theological standpoints without compromising any of the cardinal attributes of God. This is where the other responses (Boethians, Molinists, Ochamists, and Opentheists) to the divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma failed. The four major responses discussed above are swift to compromise a major attribute of God in their attempts to solve the problem. Another thing that makes Augustine’s solution so plausible is that it has some positive implications to the contemporary discourse on the problem of evil, particularly moral evil. The next section of the paper attempts to point to some of the theodical implications of Augustine position.
Theodical Implications of the Augustinian Solution
Augustine’s discussion on ‘freewill’ is important in that it solves the questions of why is it that God did not create freewill in such a way that man will always do what is good,蜉 the question of why the freewill that God created could be used for what is not good, and the question of why is it that God did create the freewill since He must have known that such freewill is mis-usable. Augustine’s answers to these questions are very important to the contemporary discourse on freewill theodicy. How did Augustine answer these questions? In his book titled “On the Free Choice of the Will” (Book I,II, III), Augustine argues that if man is compelled or programmed to always use his freewill to do good, then such a freewill cannot be referred to as freewill in libertarian sense. His view on God’s foreknowledge and libertarian freewill is compatibilism. Augustine argued that the freewill as at when created was good, meanwhile good at intermediate level.蜉 Augustine distinguishes the three levels of “goodness” in creation. The levels are the highest, intermediate and the lowest. The highest level is the level of God’s goodness and it cannot be turned ‘less-good’ while freewill is at the media bona (intermediate) level which can be turned ‘less-good and misused. To Augustine, this is the reason why the freewill is misused by the free agent. The goodness at intermediate and lower level can be used to either do good or evil, therefore, God did not create what is not good when he created freewill. I believe strongly that this Augustine’s argument is very important in the current discussion on theodicy.
Also, Augustine answered the question of “why did God create freewill since He foreknew that the freewill will be misused and turned ‘less-good.” Augustine appeals to the significance of freewill in God’s creation. The Lord wants to create a world where there will be moral goodness, and for there to be moral goodness, freewill is indispensable. Therefore, God’s foreknowledge of future misuse of freewill He has given could not have compelled God not to create freewill for man, because if He did not create freewill simply because some people will misuse it, then what of those who will use the same for moral goodness. If freewill was not given by God, moral evil may not be possible but moral good will also be absent, but since God wanted to create a world where moral goodness, (or moral responsibility) is present therefore God could not have denied freewill to man because of His prescience of the misuse of the freewill.蜉 To Augustine, a run-away horse is better than a stone which does not run away because it lacks self-movement and sense perception. Most Freewill-defenders follow these arguments of Augustine and even though there have been a lot of modifications and refinements over the time, the arguments, I believe, can be restated (and of course it has been restated蜉) to meet up with the contemporary atheistic arguments that is based on the logical problem of evil.
Conclusion
There is a significant need for an acceptable solution to the dilemma involved in freewill and divine foreknowledge but if such a solution will be acceptable it must be based on a proper theological system and sound biblical interpretation. Any solution which compromises the basic tripod-stand of biblical attributes of God and biblical view of man (i.e Christian anthropology) can never be a good solution but only a solution of “compromise.” The four major views discussed in this paper fall within the line of compromise and not a logical solution and this becomes very obvious when compared to the Augustine’s response. The Molinists, Opentheists, Ochamists, and Boethians wrongly believed that they can accept anti-Christian methodology without buying inevitably into a non-Christian theology. The major problem with the views lies within their methodology. The methodology and presupposition with which they find solution to the dilemma is not logical and orthodox enough particularly when compared to Augustinian solution. Their resultant solutions have a lot of negative theological and philosophical implications (soteriological, eschatological and anthropological implications).
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